Diverse Dokumente

The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

Strategy for Countering, UK, 2010

The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material

Strategic National Guidance, UK, 2004

The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and open environment exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials

Strategic National Guidance, 2011

Stuxnet: targeting Iran's nuclear programme

IISS Strategic Comments

A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group

Assessing the Terrorist Threat, 2010

The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

World at Risk, US, 2008

How tough is it to build a dirty bomb?

On PBS NewsHour, Miles O'Brien reports on the threat that radioactive "dirty bombs" could pose to cities in the U.S., and what's being done to prevent a radiological attack from happening.


Referat "ABC-Abwehr - Medizinische Aspekte"

⇒  Referat "ABC-Abwehr - medizinische Aspekte" 
anlässlich der Generalversammlung 2010 der ABC Suisse Sektion Zürich von Oberstlt Christian Comptesse

Monströser Aufwand für die Bombe

⇒  Artikel aus der Berner Zeitung, Oktober 2010

Amateur hobbyists are creating home-brew molecular-biology labs, but can they ferment a revolution?

⇒  Heidi Ledford, NATURE, Vol. 467, 7.Oktober 2010

Garage Biology

Amateur scientists who experiment at home should be welcomed by the professionals.

⇒  NATURE, Vol. 467, 7.Oktober 2010

CBRNE Terrorism Newsletter

⇒  Summer Issue Part 1

CBRNE Terrorism Newsletter

⇒  Summer Issue Part 2

CBRNE Terrorism Newsletter

⇒  Fall Issue Part 3

Tokyo drift?

Dr Tomoya Saito, research fellow at Keio University, looks at CBRN defence capabilty in Japan 15 years after the subway sarin attack in Tokyo.

⇒  CBRNe World, Autumn 2010

Synthetic double-stranded DNA

Synthetic biology, the developing interdisciplinary field that focuses on both the design and fabrication of novel biological components and systems as well as the re-design and fabrication of existing biological systems, is poised to become the next significant transforming technology for the life sciences and beyond. Synthetic biology is not constrained by the requirement of using existing genetic material and thus has great potential to be used to generate organisms, both currently existing and novel, including pathogens that could threaten public health, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or materiel. In the United States, many such pathogens, as well as certain toxins, are defined by specific existing regulations: namely, the Select Agent Regulations (SAR) and, for international orders, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). To reduce the risk that individuals with ill intent may exploit the application of nucleic acid synthesis technology to obtain genetic material derived from or encoding Select Agents or Toxins and, as applicable, agents on EAR’s Commerce Control List (CCL), the U.S. Government has developed Guidance that provides a framework for screening synthetic double-stranded DNA (dsDNA). This Guidance sets forth recommended baseline standards for the gene and genome synthesis industry and other providers of synthetic dsDNA products regarding the screening of orders so that they are filled in compliance with current U.S. regulations and to encourage best practices in addressing biosecurity concerns associated with the potential misuse of their products to bypass existing regulatory controls.

⇒  Guidance of the Departement of Health and Human Services

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